Complementarity between private and public investment in R&D: A Dynamic
  Panel Data analysis by Tarek, Sadraoui & Zina, Naceur Ben
 
 
 
 
Abstract— This paper investigates the relationship between 
private and public investment in R&D, while taking into 
account the effect of several instruments policies such as 
subsidies and taxes. We design a new look of knowledge 
spillovers and R&D cooperation to explain the contribution of 
public and private R&D on growth. We propose a 
heterogeneous dynamic panel data model to consider the 
endogenous effect of R&D investment. We also distinguish 
between the estimated long and short run results. Our results 
based on a sample of 23 countries over the period 1992-2004 
indicate that both public and private investments in R&D are 
complementary. By establishing an endogenous growth model, 
the estimates indicate that public and private R&D depends on 
the host country’s human capital investment. Results indicate 
that foreign direct investment is a more significant spillover 
channel than imports. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
       Is public R&D complementary to private R&D, or does it 
substitute for and tend to “crowd out” private R&D? Conflicting 
answers are given to this question. We survey the body of available 
econometric evidence accumulated over the past 16 years. A 
framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize 
and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on 
dynamic panel data from various countries1. We conclude by 
offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this 
issue. 
       Most people think that government R&D activities contribute 
to innovation and productivity, many economists and policymakers 
have grown frustrated with the paucity of systematic statistical 
evidence documenting a direct contribution from public R&D (see 
Paul et al,. [24]. Econometric findings concerning the productivity 
growth effects of R&D seems to be that there is a significantly 
positive and relatively high rate of return to R&D investments at 
both the private and social levels (Cassiman and Veugelers, [8]). In 
a recent survey, Paul et al,. [24] suggest that the especially 
pronounced differential over the returns on tangible capital 
investments observed at the private level may reflect individual 
firms’ perceptions of especially high private risk in the case of R&D. 
Public funding of R&D can contribute indirectly, by 
complementing and hence stimulating private R&D expenditures.  
           Our approach will be to adopt a new econometric approach 
using a dynamic panel data studies to analyse if public investment in 
R&D are complement or substitute for private investment in R&D. 
In literature review, we can conclude that the majority of the 
econometric studies are concentrated on the impact of public R&D 
contracts and grants upon private R&D investment by 
manufacturing firms and industries (see for example, Lach [20], 
Christopher [10] and Eric [12]).  
          The object of our paper is to give the theoretical and empirical 
arguments which allow a satisfactory apprehension of the role that 
the authorities must play in the fields of research and innovation. 
The activity of R&D represents a significant source of development 
of new knowledge and technological innovation (Guellec and 
Van-Pottelsborghe, [14]). The effort towards activity of R&D 
involves with a great importance and this through several resources 
devoted to the various sectors and institutions of research. 
Expenditure of research and development especially constitute a 
principal source of growth of productivity for innovating countries. 
Whereas, Sigrid [23] and Ting [31] suggest that, for countries, 
where the activity of R&D misses almost technological knowledge 
and innovations of which they profit are generally resulting from the 
importation of equipment and goods of intensives investments in 
technical progress. At the same times, Chaturvedi and Chataway [9] 
recommend that knowledge capabilities and knowledge 
management can be considered as key resources for firms in both 
developed and developing countries. 
II. R&D INVESTMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT'S R&D POLICIES 
Today, we can observe an expansion of policies of innovations in 
the developed countries which devote great investment for R&D. 
What proves the creation of the climates favourable to the level of 
these countries for the innovation? It is significant that during these 
last years, companies of high technology or advanced technology’s 
(pharmaceutical, aeronautical…) expenditure of research and 
development increased significantly. The role of the governmental 
policies as regards R&D is not to neglect. Indeed, the policies of 
innovation define specific actions of the State, which must 
encourage the accumulation of a qualified labour on the one hand, 
and to help the companies to prospect the markets on the other hand. 
This justifies the need for the public administrations for supporting 
the R&D.   
        Thus, which are the reasons of the government aid and the 
mechanisms the alternate ones available to the public 
administrations to support the R&D? To answer these questions we 
try to analyze the justification of the government aid with the R&D 
starting from the economic theories of growth. 
2.1 Neoclassic growth theory  
        For Neo-classic theory of growth, technical progress is 
supposed to be exogenous factors. With the balance of long term, 
population growth and technical progress determine the level of the 
growth rate. This implies, according to the basic assumptions, that 
the long-term growth rate is stable, and given in an exogenous way. 
Within this framework, the impact of an action of the authorities is 
practically ignored.   
        The neoclassic theory of the growth supposes that the economy 
starts from a weak relationship between capital and labour. Just as 
the marginal returns on capital are decreasing. What reduces the 
Complementarity between private and public investment 
in R&D: A Dynamic Panel Data analysis 
Tarek  Sadraoui* & Naceur Ben Zina 
 
 
 
encouragement to be invested in the new capital? Thus each new 
unit of capital produces a lower income and less large savings. In the 
long run, there will be absence of incentive to invest. In short, we 
can say that the assumptions which underlie the neo-classic theory 
are not realistic. The technological change is not always an 
exogenous factor outside the market, determined by an unknown 
process. To the 20th centuries, a good number of discoveries and 
progress were carried out in the commercial sector by companies 
with lucrative goal and not by public administrations or universities 
where research is directed by non-commercial forces. Markets are 
seldom in perfect competition, moreover, the private sector is not 
capable to produce all the desired goods and services, because some 
of them are goods public and certain others produce external effects.  
2.2     Endogenous growth theory 
       The endogenous theory of growth recommends the relaxation 
of certain neo-classic assumptions and incorporates the failures of 
the market. However, the economic growth in the long run is 
directed by the accumulation of the factors of production founded 
this faith on knowledge, in particular, human capital, training, R&D 
and innovation (Griliches, [13]). The endogenous models of growth 
are characterized by a great diversity of the resources selected: The 
investment in physical capital, in human capital, public capital, and 
labour division, learning by doing, research and the technological 
innovation (Romer, [27]).   
      2.3    R&D investment and market imperfection  
        Economic theory and empirical proof show that technical 
progress, because of its incidence on the factors of production, 
constitutes key element in the long run determining economic 
growth; in certain countries, it represents even the most significant 
element. However, it is not a question of an economic justification 
of the official intervention for allocate the resources in favour of 
R&D. But, this intervention in a market economy is justified by 
incapacity of market to distribute resources in an efficient or 
acceptable way as regards social aspects. With regard to the 
investment in R&D, external effects and market imperfections 
testify the incapacity of market, and the effects are felt not only 
beyond particular companies but also beyond national borders.  
        In a market economy, a company will not invest in a project if 
it knows that it can not adapt the possible receipts, however if it 
cannot adapt a portion of these receipts, it will invest if this portion 
is enough to make a profitable investment. Asymmetrical 
information and imperfect competition constitute two other kinds of 
imperfections of market involving under investment in R&D. For 
example, asymmetrical information prevents effective operation of 
capital market. Indeed, it can involve rationing of appropriations as 
well as abandonment of investments in R&D in projects with strong 
chances of success thanks to the plan of financing, and the 
continuation of investments in the project having weak chances of 
success. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Our study contributes to the empirical literature -which is 
discussed here- on the analysis of the existence of a relation between 
private and public investment in R&D and their real effect on 
economic growth; do public funds substitute or complement private 
R&D expenditure? 
We derive our econometric specification from a function 
including interactions between internal and external R&D in the 
augmentation of the knowledge stock. The model also takes into 
account potential productivity convergence by including lagged 
productivity levels. Our study’s inferences are based on a dynamic 
panel data model, which allows us to control for the existence of 
unobserved fixed effects that are likely to affect R&D decisions. 
Estimation is carried out by several consistent dynamic panel data 
methods, among which generalized method of moments, which 
allows for the presence of weakly endogenous explanatory 
variables. In this way the analysis can take into account both degree 
and possibility effects of R&D to address the issue of optimal 
combinations of R&D expenditures.  
In this paper, we contribute the first panel data study 
exploring complementarity between public R&D and private 
R&D in a dynamic panel framework. We examine the impact 
of internal and external R&D on economic growth in 
sixteen-year panel for 23 developed and developing 
countries.  
IV. COMPLEMENTARITY VERSUS SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC R&D 
   Theoretical work did not succeed in slicing on favourable or 
unfavourable effect using certain political instruments on the level 
of R&D in private sectors. The results of each model strongly 
depend on its structure and its assumptions. Empirical work, leads to 
homogeneous results and identifies a positive effect of public R&D 
on that private (Paul, et al,. [24]). With an aim of knowing the 
relation between public and private R&D we give an overall picture 
of the activities of R&D in world. Indeed, in this section, we attach 
more importance to activity of public and private R&D in the most 
significant poles in world. 
Through time and with the improved scientific methods in 
particularly studies of  Jason, et al., [19], it became clearly that the 
final situation towards the effect of the public funds of R&D cannot 
be made. Thus, in general, two fields can be identified and which are 
used to analyze the relation between private investment and public 
in research and development with knowing quantitative and 
qualitative studies: On the one hand; for the qualitative studies, data 
are frequently based on the investigations. On the other hand; for the 
quantitative studies, they are based on macro and micro-economic 
information of a significant number of companies (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, [8]).   
        Today, several activities of R&D are carried out on the level of 
the services sector. On the one hand, this is due to the external 
sources of the strategies of manufacturing industries in the Eighties. 
On the other hand, the transformation of information and 
technology of communication get more opportunities for innovating 
sectors. So the governments help more and more activities of R&D 
in several sectors with an aim of stimulating technological 
performances of their countries. Thus, several examples can be 
quoted. At this level, for the Nineties and more precisely in 1999, 
the total expenditure of R&D of Germany is 47 billion dollars where 
66% of this amount is invested by private industries, 18% by 
government and the remainder are invested by foreign companies.  
        Thus, Claudia, [11] suggest that an international comparison 
on behalf of public programs of R&D shows that Germany is one of 
principal countries which grant funds for the technological 
performance. At this level, manufacturing industry plays a very 
significant role concerning R&D. For example, the strategic 
planning of the national research evaluation in Thailand as indicates 
 
 
 
it Jarunee, [18] is to allocate the budget to support the research 
programmes and projects. Jarunee suggest that to improve the model 
evaluation framework for R&D investments, the public hearing 
forum was organised. From there, a question emerges up to what 
point evolution of public funds of R&D makes it possible to 
stimulate R&D carried out by private sector, and on which level 
results are checked? Recently, an econometric micro study tackled 
the question of the impact of political instruments about activity of 
R&D deprived on the level of companies.  
        Several other studies are more precisely interested in testing 
the effects of public subsidies in R&D on the amount of deprived 
investment see for example Lai et al., [21], Hans and Almas, [16] 
and Christopher, [10]. The major goal of these studies is to know if 
public subsidies of research and development can have an effect of 
reduction or increase in the expenditure of R&D. Most of results 
suggest that public subsidies of R&D on the level of several 
industries showed that there is a small tendency to the effect of 
ousting “Crowding out”. In addition, it seems not to have any effect 
or degree of Complementarity.   
In the following section we empirically test fundamental 
relation which we seek to analyze in the case of 23 countries 
for the period 1992-2004, in other words we test the 
existence of a relation of Complementarity and to check this 
result. 
V. EMPIRICAL VALIDATION: DYNAMIC PANEL DATA  
        The objective of this work is to test the impact of an action of 
public policies empirically on the evolution of R&D in private 
sector while trying to surmount limits. The modelling that we follow 
to measure the effect of the R&D deprived on the public one; while 
taking into account some determinants of private R&D; is the one of 
Bettina and al,. (2002). This modelling has also been applied by: 
Busom, [7] and Lach, [20]. The gait of these authors can be 
summarized like follows:   
Private R&D = ß * public R&D + control variables + e 
        The underlying logic is simple: If the coefficient β* has a 
positive sign we can say that public R&D are complementary for 
private R&D. In other words, an increase of 1% of public research 
and development level entails a growth of β*% of private R&D. On 
contrary, if β* has a negative sign we can say that there is a relation 
of substitutability between public and private R&D. In this part we 
try, to give a general setting for the models to estimate while putting 
accent on some remarks and inconveniences of these models. We 
apply a dynamic panel data model. Finally, after having estimated 
the model we analyze results.    
      5.1 Dynamic panel data: Definition and evaluations 
method 
       Dynamic models are characterized by presence of one or 
several endogenous variables delayed among explanatory variables.  
Our specified model is a dynamic panel model is given by:   
'-1  y y x vi t i ti t i t    (1) 
Under another forms one was writing our model as below:    
-1 1 2 3 4      G VAR R M IDEit it it itit it iti        (2) 
Where; 
-1yit : Endogenous variable appears in the regression as being a 
retarded explanatory variable. In other words, present stocks of 
research and development of country (i) are explained by stocks of 
research of the period (t-1).    
 X: Represent the vector of exogenous variables; these variables are 
added value (VA), public research (G), import (M), foreign direct 
investment (IDE) and private research;    
(α, β): Designate parameters to estimate;   
μi :  Constitute individual heterogeneity as: μi   i.i.d. ~ N [(0, 1)];   
And: vi,t is stochastic term as: vi,t~ i.i.d. [(0, 1)].   
yi,t is the logarithm of volume of R&D in country (i). 
 xi,t is determinant vector of R&D.  
μi is the specific effect of country (i). This specific effect can be a 
stationary or uncertain effect.  
 
5.2  Evaluation Method  
        The evaluation of the model by traditional methods (Ordinary 
Least Square "OLS" and within) gives biased and non convergent 
values because of inter-relationship between retarded endogenous 
variable and individual heterogeneity. We try to demonstrate for the 
case of a simple model the inconveniences of these methods of 
evaluations. 
For dynamic panel model, Within transformations and Ordinary 
Least Squares are biased and non-convergent estimators.  
We assume the simple specification: 
-1y y itiit it      
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        In summary, the bias is positive and increases with the variance 
of the specific effect.  Indeed, yi,t is function of vi,t and yi,t-1 is also. 
yi,t-1 is an explanatory variable correlated with stochastic term. It 
introduces a bias in the value of ordinary least squares. Even as 
putting hypothesis that stochastic terms are not correlated, this value 
is non-convergent.     
       For within case we consider the following transformation:     - - - . -1. -1 . -1y y y y it iit i it i     
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The numerator is convergent when the second term converges 
towards zero.  
The numerator of the second term:         Ni Tt iitN yy iitNTp 1 1 .1.11lim     
2 2
2 ( 1 )
(1 )
T
v T T
T
as a
a
- - - +
=
-
 
 
And the denominator        Ni
T
t
iitN
yyNTp 1 1
2
1.1
1lim   
2 2 2
2 ( 1 )1 21
1 (1 )
T
v T T
T T
aas a
a a
æ ö÷- ç - - + ÷ç ÷ç= - ÷ç ÷ç- ÷÷çè ø-
 
 
The estimator of Least Square Dummy variable is convergent 
if T is infinite. If T is fixed, N, the estimator is 
non-convergent. Our model should not be estimated by the 
method of OLS and LSDV due to the fact that estimating by 
these methods led to ad hoc results. Which are then adequate 
methods to estimate our model? We propose below two 
methods which consist in obtaining consistent estimators.  
 
5.3  Anderson and Hsiao Method 
       Anderson and Hsiao [1] proposed, initially, to write the model 
from first difference to eliminate individual heterogeneity. They 
propose for the transformation two instruments.  
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         The two values are convergent when N and T  . 
However, an inter-relationship always persists between endogenous 
variable in first difference and residual term. Authors proposed to 
resort to the method of instrumental variables to surmount this 
problem. Thus, they propose to use instrument endogenous variable 
with two lags or his first differences. These instruments are 
correlated with explanatory variable and are not with residual term.  
To get more efficient results, Arellano and Bond [2] approach 
permits to get a value of generalized moments “GMM” more 
efficient.   
5.4  Arellano and Bond Approach  
       Arellano and Bond [2] are the first in 1991 that proposed an 
extension of GMM introduced initially by Hansen [15], to the case 
of panel data for a simple model AR (1):  
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Where    0  
         We consider the case where temporal dimension is small while 
individual dimension (N) is important. We consider that individual 
effects are stationary and we assume traditional hypotheses of 
residues: 
In difference models (5) can be written as below: 
0 (6)-1   y y uitit it   
       Where uit = vit-vit-1. 
We test for every individual of the linear restrictions of type: 
 - 0 2,..., ; 3,...-1 -       E for j t t Ty y yit it it j    (7) 
        The gait of Arellano and Bond, in presence of the exogenous 
variables, consists in estimating the model in difference: 
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The preceding dynamic model (8) can be rewritten for each 
individual in the following form:  
(11)  y W Vi i iii   
        Where τ is a vector of parameter and Wi is a matrix that 
contains the retarded dependent variable and explanatory variables. 
The method proposed by these author’s permits to get a GMM in 
two stages is written in following form:   
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        However, to have previous value GMM, it is necessary to pass 
by a first stage that consists in making wished transformation (first 
difference or orthogonal deviation), to find and to use instruments 
matrix and to achieve a first evaluation named "evaluation of first 
stage". This stage corresponds to an evaluation that permits to 
provide estimated residues after transformation. In the first stage, 
the values are gotten while using Hi  as: 
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        The objective of transformation is, as at Anderson and Hsiao 
[1], to eliminate individual heterogeneity of the model. The number 
of instrument increases in the time for every individual. In the case 
where exist explanatory variables xit in the model correlated with 
heterogeneity individual µi. Optimal instruments matrix 
corresponding Zi is equal to:   
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         Arellano and Bond [2] propose a test verifying the absence of 
autocorrelation of first and second order. Thus, if distribution is non 
auto-correlated, this test gives a value of residues differentiated 
negative and significant to first order and non significant to the 
second order. This test that is based on auto-covariance of residues 
follows a normal law N (0,1) under hypothesis H0. Otherwise, 
authors propose the test of validity of instruments of Sargan 
(1988a). The statistical test equal to:   
** ' ˆ (1 5 )ˆ '
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VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The unit root tests became a current step for analysis of time 
series stationnarity. However, practical application of these tests on 
panel data is recent. The tests most frequently used are those of 
Levin and Lin, [22] and of Im, Pesaran and Shin [17]3. Recently, 
several procedures of unit root tests and Cointegration were 
developed for panel data models. The addition of individual 
dimension to temporal dimension offers an advantage, in practical 
application of unit root and Cointegration tests (Pedroni, [25, 26]).  
The checking of non-stationary properties for all panel 
variables leads us to study the existence of a long run relation 
between these variables. The Cointegration study by applying 
Pedroni Cointegration tests based on unit root tests on residues 
estimated. Cointegration tests on panel data consist in testing the 
presence of unit root in the estimated residues. However, the 
problem of fallacious regressions, of the time series, also arises in 
the case of panel data.  First step is to test unit root for each of series. 
         6.1 Unit Root Tests  
Levin and Lin [22], consider the following model: 
            yi,t = iyi,t–1 + Zit  + ui,t    (i=1, …, N; t=1, …, T)     (16) 
 
       Where, Zi,t is the deterministic component and ui,t is a stationary 
process. i  is the fixed effect, 
        The Levin and Lin, [22] tests assume that ui,t are iid (0,2u) and 
i= for all i.  The LL test is restrictive in the sense that it requires  
to be homogeneous across i. Im, Pesaran and Shin [17] (IPS) allow 
for a heterogeneous coefficient of yi,t-1 and propose an alternative 
testing procedure based on averaging individual unit root test 
statistics. IPS suggested an average of the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests when ui,t is serially correlated with 
different series. Correlation properties across cross-sectional units, 
i.e;  
, 1   ipi t j i j i t j i tu u  . 
      Substituting this ui,t in (1) we get: 
 , 1 1        
piy y y zi t i i t j i j i t j i t i t     (17) 
The null and for all countries i the alternative hypothesis are: 
Ho: i = 1 
Ha: i < 1 
For at least one i, the IPS t-bar statistic is defined as the average of 
the individual ADF statistic as: 
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Where ti is the individual t-statistic of testing Ho: i = 1 in (18).  It 
is known for a fixed N as T   
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IPS assumes that tiT  are iid4 are have finite mean variance.  Then; 
1 [ / 1
1
(0, 1)
[ / ]1
       

N
N t E tiT iT iN i
N
Var tiT i

  (19) 
As N  central limit theorem.  Hence 
 [ / 1
(0, 1)
[ / ]1
 
 

N t E tiT i
t NIPS Var tiT i

       (20) 
        As T  followed by N  sequentially, the values of 
E[tiT/i=1] and Var[tiT/i=1] have been computed by IPS 
simulations for different values of  T and is. As applying test on 
our complete model our results is summarized in table 1 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In our survey, we tried to put accent on private and public 
investment in R&D, for the case of 23 countries which presents 
different levels of R&D. We tried to clarify relation that exists 
between private and public research. This empirical survey wanted 
to give account, the effects of different determinants on private 
investment in R&D and to know if public and private investments in 
R&D are complement or substitute. 
        Econometric approach consists in the regression of some 
measures of private R&D on public R&D with some control 
variables. The evaluation that we presented in our work corresponds 
to GMM evaluation in first difference and in orthogonal deviation. 
We prefer to refer to results of this evaluation because it permits to 
eliminate rigorous way all bias to none observed individual 
heterogeneity and offer, a better efficiency of results. Empiric 
evaluations confirm a positive effect of public R&D in different 
country (positive and meaningful effect in all evaluations). Results 
of our empiric survey are relative for our sample and they go in the 
sense of results of ulterior studies, which showed that there is a 
positive and meaningful relation between private and public 
investment in R&D.    
 
 
 
        All results are in favor of a positive relation between private 
and public R&D which can be assumed by a complementarities 
between them. In our study we have indicate that all variables are 
stationary by an application of unit root tests that’s can contribute to 
search Cointegration relation between them and determinate the 
number of these relation. Another important think, we can give the 
impact of public R&D to private R&D for each country to specify 
the nature of relation and how private R&D contributes for public 
sector. In summary, all countries must stimulate private sector in 
R&D activities to promote economic growth and integrate a new 
innovation system which can go with their own economic 
environment.  
        Some studies put in value of other factors that can be important 
as: competition in the market, public politics and cooperation 
concerning R&D between firms. Cooperation in R&D is a part of 
the new strategies developed by firms in more global and 
competitive economic environment. These last factors are not to 
disregard and can be subject of a future research concerning the 
relation between public and private investment in R&D.   
APPENDIX 
Table 1Unit root Tests  
Statistics R G M VA IDE 
Levin-Lin  
ADF stat 
-2.357 -0.343 1. 809  1.489 -1.674 
IPS ADF stat -2.296  1.773  2.175 1.640 -1.572 
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